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SeparatiSm in the UniteD eUrope:  
olD problem with a new faCe
The focus of this article is the research of the questions, related to the development of separatism in 
Europe. The prerequisites for the development of the separatist movement within the European integration 
are analysed, as well as the forms of its realization. The EU’s role in settling the separatist conflicts of the 
member states is explained. The author is proving the conclusion that in future, within the United Europe, 
the demands for self-determination will be reviewed by the European Union’s institutions more and more 
often. Those events will be happening on the background of the mounting tensions between the EU, its 
member states and their regions.
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Сепаратизм в объединенной Европе: старая проблема с новым лицом
Исследуются вопросы, связанные с развитием сепаратизма в Европейском Союзе. Проанали-
зированы предпосылки развития сепаратизма в условиях европейской интеграции, а также формы 
его реализации. Раскрыта роль ЕС в разрешении сепаратистских конфликтов государств-членов 
ЕС. Обосновывается вывод о том, что в перспективе в объединенной Европе требования о самоо-
пределении будут все чаще рассматриваться через институты Европейского Союза в рамках уси-
ливающегося напряжения между ЕС, его государствами-членами и регионами государств-членов.
Ключевые слова: сепаратизм; регионализм; Европейский Союз; европейская интеграция; 
членство в организации.
Theme formulation and topic relevance. From Scotland to Flemish region and 
further to Catalonia: separatism tendencies in the contemporary European Union is 
not a vexatious exception but a certain tendency that gradually gains momentum. 
On the one hand, europeans clearly understand the rationality of the “united we 
stand” slogan since only the United Europe is able to be heard by the USA, Russia 
and China as well as dignifiedly respond to the modern global challenges. However, 
on the other hand, we observe the tendency of separatism aspiration, desires to 
convert the European Union from international organization into the Europe of 
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regions. As a result, the process of the United Europe construction on the federalist 
principles essentialy complicates the regionalism and separatism tendencies. 
In numerous EU member states’ regions, we may observe not only the deve-
lopment of an elemental street protest movement but also the purposeful activity 
of the regional elite which results in the intependency referendums. Here come the 
following questions: “Why do the EU member states in general, built on the demo-
cratic legal system principles, are developing and successfully elaborating separatism? 
What will be the legal consequences of this tendency for the European countries and 
the Union in general? What will be the European Union’s role in it?” This article 
is dedicated to the aforementioned questions’ as well as the number of other issues’ 
analysis. 
Analysis of the latest researches and publications. The issue of separatism in 
Europe in foreign literature was raised numerously, however mostly it was studied 
by politologists, historians and economists as a wider issue – the European regio-
nalism [1-6]. Though, in the Ukrainian legal studies a modern complex research of 
problems and consequences of separatism for the EU state members is still absent. 
As a result, the purpose of this article is the analysis of questions’ complex connected 
with, on the one hand, studies of the EU separatism nature and, on the other hand, 
analysis of the European Union membership acquirement by the states which are 
tending to secede.
Presentment of the principle matters. The predominant state-centric paradigm 
of international law is a hindrance to the formal acceptance of the realities of an 
international system in which sovereignty is increasingly dispersed both within and 
beyond state borders [7, p. 170]. Given the continued primacy of statehood in the 
international system, however, it is unlikely that international law will undergo a 
fundamental shift in its approaches to statehood, self-determination, or secession 
anytime in the near future [8, p. 101].
Oddly enough, the separatism development is, to certain extent, affected by 
the globalization and regional integration processes, which may play an integra-
tive as well as a destructive role. Globalisation and integration facilitate a closer 
interaction of the states and the out-of-state actors, their unification into transna-
tional and global networks, which are built on various channels of interdependence 
(trade, politics, security, environment and socio-cultural connections etc.) [9]. EU 
multi-level governance has provided less national economic dependence, and more 
political freedom to regional entities thus, potentially impacting the confidence of 
independence-minded regions [10, p. 10-11]. On the other side, globalisation may 
favor the fragmentation of the established political and social orders, allowing for 
regional and transnational movements to set tasks, the implementation of which 
bears a threat to sovereignty and territorial unity of the states. Countries no lon-
ger have the monopoly of mediating the relationship of their regions to the global 
market and to international regimes. The increased mobility of capital and the rise 
of transnational corporations have eroded the ability of states to control their own 
spatial economies [11].
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Separatist movements in the modern world are directionally heterogeneous: if 
the ones are striving for autonomy in terms of the national borders, the others are 
bravely aiming at secession and establishment of a new independent state. According 
to the statistics from the year of 1990, more than 30 new countries were created and 
the separatist movements are not going to cease expanding on that number [12]. It 
should be noted that the dissolution of ex-socialist federations (USSR, ČSSR, SFRY) 
was viewed as a quite natural and positive phenomenon owing to the infringement of 
fundamental human rights of its citizens. Development of the separatist movements 
in former USSR republics is regarded as an artificial process initiated and supported 
by Russia. [12]. However, the rapid growth of separatist movements in the Western 
European countries, functioning on established democratic and legal principles, has 
surprised the European politicians and experts. Seth Jolly points out that deeper 
integration of the EU has caused a rise in regionalist parties’ participation in national 
elections; subnational regionalist parties are rising in importance, and can present 
a potentially significant political threat to national leaders [15]. Consequently, the 
regard to separatism in Europe has changed іn the world in general and in Europe 
particularly, the so-called separatist wars, aimed at secession.
Nevertheless, the elaboration of separatism in the United Europe looks paradoxal 
only at the first sight. The European Union is usually viewed as a “post-sovereign” 
political and legal system. [8, p. 100], which, in case of a successful integrational 
process development, could have been a successful model for the integrational “core” 
formation in South and Latin America, Asia and CIS. [16, p. 35]. Regional politics 
based on solidarity and subsidiarity principles implementation by the European 
Union might have vanished the separatism issue in the United Europe as it is since 
the regions have acquired the ability to legally enter the international level (within 
EU) in different spheres of social life alongside with the national government [17, 
с. 60; 18].  Despite that, the separatist movements are still developing and destabi-
lizing not only the state members but the European Union in general.
What favors the development of separatism in the EU? First of all, it’s the 
separatist movements striving to preserve and elaborate their identity according to 
the article 3 of Treaty on European Union, stating: «It shall respect its rich cultural 
and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safe-
guarded and enhanced» [20]. The identity of separatist movements is usually based 
on common history, culture, language, religion and social unity. Taking into account 
these identities and disputes with the member states’ governments, the separatists 
are successfully using communication technologies and transnational networks to 
organize political actions as well as to attract the support of diasporic communities 
and foreign sympathectic individuals. The role of identity in terms of separatist 
movements’ development is portrayed in the example of the Basque Country and 
Catalonia in Spain, for which the memories of repressions and violation of cultural 
and lingual rights (as is kown, the Spanish government has blocked the recognition 
of Catalonias as nation and giving preference to Catalan language in the region) is 
an important factor in the separatist climate vitality maintenance.
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Therwith, it should be noted that cultural and lingual identity is not always used 
by the separatist movements in their campaign. Thus, even though Scotland has a 
different cultural and lingual identity from the rest of Great Britain, contemporary 
Scottish separatists are not making use of this factor. Moreover, they emphasize that 
in case of secession from the United Kingdom, Scotland will retain close cultural 
connections with England: English language will remain the official language as well 
as the British Pound will be the official currency of Independent Scotland. Analys-
ing the issue of the separatist tendencies’ amplification in the EU, the economic 
factor of this process must be definitely taken into consideration. Wealthier regions 
(Catalonia, Scotland, Padania and Flanders) believe that they contribute a lot to 
the central budget, but they do not get enough capital investment. Additionally, 
wealthier regions are usually dissatisfied with their representation in the national 
government, along with having too little control over its own resources. Thus, Cat-
alonia is one of the wealthiest regions in Spain, however its taxes are collected and 
allocated by the Spanish government. As a result, funds returned back to Catalonia 
are significantly lower than the taxes collected by Madrid. From each Euro paid by 
the Catalan resident as a Spanish budget tax, only 57 Cents are being returned back 
to Catalonia. As a consequence, the Catalan government is forced to approach to the 
Spanish government in order to receive loans to pay off its debts [21]. To deal with 
the Catalan debt, the Spanish government forces the regional authority to conduct 
ferocious and unpopular activities. It is indicative that the Spanish government has 
not recoursed to measures which could facilitare the imorivement of the Catalan 
si tuation after getting help from the European Union itself. It is clear that such 
po licy of Madrid in terms of Catalonia is one of the reasons why Catalonia is striving 
for secession. The economic separatism is also developing in Belgium and Italy. 
For the government of a state which faces a regional entity secession it is not 
economically beneficial if the region becomes an EU member itself. With the intro-
duction of a new member state would come the need to reallocate EU funds. With 
the admittance into the EU of an independent Catalonia, a portion of the funds 
presently allotted to Spain logically would have to be reallocated to the Catalonia. 
Budgetary decisions require the approval of the Council, the institution representing 
national interests. Spanish opposition to a reduction in its allocated funds would 
likely be strong. Under the terms of the Luxembourg Compromise, when an issue 
before the Council relates to «very important interests» of a member state, that state 
is entitled to a right of veto. Were Spain to veto a decision to reallocate a portion 
of its funds to the Catalonia, the EU would have to look for alternative means of 
financing Catalonia membership. This would present a financial burden for all EU 
member states [22, p. 343].
Ironically, a certain impulse, if not direct but at least a side one, is given to the 
separatist tendencies by the European Union1, though not all of the researchers agree 
1 Keating argues, «globalization and European integration have encouraged the re-emergence of 
nationalism within established states’—a notion that connects directly with city-regions» [23, 
p. 1]. Khanna has noted, «[the entire European Union is thus a reminder that local independence 
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on that conclusion. [25; 26, p. 2, 7–8]. It is overly simplistic to conclude that the 
EU encourages or discourages separatism or that it makes secession easier or more 
difficult. Nonetheless, European integration «affect[s] how the parties to a [separa-
tist] conflict perceive their own interests and identities» [8, p. 78–79].
Introduction of the EU regional policy, fixation of the subsidiarity principle 
and creation of the regional Committee has facilitated further decentralization of 
the federative (Austria, Belhium), regional (Spain, Great Britain) and unitary state 
governance. The delegation of authority from central administrative agencies to the 
lower levels is giving a bigger autonomy to the subregions, therefore, an ability to 
implement their own interests which are not always indetical with the national ones. 
On the other hand, particularly in conditions of the economic crisis, the national 
goverments are not always capable of national and regional tasks realization. As 
long as the regional communities and their elite are dissatisfied with incapability of 
the central authority to ensure their needs, they start to demonstrate a proclivity 
towards autonomy or even independency acquirement
Under the aforementioned conditions, an intercourse with the EU institutions 
becomes more attractive for the regional entities aiming for independency. However, 
it shoud be mentioned that the separatist regions have not alwys positively referred 
to the integration process. At first, the nationalists have regarded integration as a 
sovereignty transfer over Scotland or Catalonia from London or Madrid to Brussels. 
The situation has changed by the 1980s, when Scottish and Flemish nationalists are 
becoming supporters of the European integration and «independency in Europe».
As is known, small states in the EU are able to have a bigger influence in the 
European issues’ resolution as well as a better access to receiving financial support. 
The point is that after the creation of the EU in which the common market is 
functioning, the size of a state (the size of national market) ceases to play a sig-
nificat role. Within the European Union small states are capable of being similarly 
successful. This implies that once a country becomes part of the EU, due to many 
economic benefits, the importance of national market size is diminished. This can 
boost the confidence of regionalist parties in national elections by lowering the 
opportunity cost of secession [9, р. 166]. Hooghe & Marks also contend that «The 
single European market reduces the economic penalty imposed by regional political 
movements are not the antithesis of lofty post-national globalism but rather the essential path toward 
it» [24, p. 78]. Similar estimation of the situation is provided by A. Pantovic: «Counterintuitively, 
EU’s supranational integration, involves national disintegration meaning regions are acquiring more 
power at a subnational level. EU’s subnational regional actors have acquired a more important role, 
and they have gained in authority and in the ability to influence decision-making at a national 
and supranational level. Since the establishment of the EU, there has a been a rise in transnational 
associations and bureaucracies dealing exclusively with regional demands, thus leading to an 
increase in budget and funds being given to regional governments. These funds provide subnational 
governments with more self-reliance, and belief that its economic, cultural and political growth 
depends on the EU rather than on the national governments. This implies that the EU facilitates 
separatism through a direct channel, by offering money to the regions». And further: «The EU 
facilitates separatism through a direct channel (offering money to the regions) and an indirect 
channel (lowering the opportunity cost of secession)» [10].
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autonomy because regional norms continue to have access to the European market» 
[10, р. 16]. The advantage larger states used diminishes due to the EU’s regional 
financial assistance, monetary policy, foreign policy, and free trade. This indicates, 
that smaller regional entities are being encouraged by the EU to seek more auto-
nomy, thus causing a rise in regional confidence and a possible increase in separatist 
claims [10, р. 16; 15, p. 4].
The European regional entites are using the EU to create transnational net-
works through it. Regions, separatist in particular, are creating offices within the 
EU institutions to gain connections with the Union’s officials as well as the trans-
national organizations, for instance, European Free Alliance, which has become a 
political party with a representation in the European Parliament in 2004. Besides, 
the se paratist regional entities are taking part in transnational political networks 
such as Conference of European Regions and Cities. 
Christopher K. believes that the EU should consider expanding the formal 
opportunities for sub-state regions to participate in EU policymaking. For example, 
the EU could elevate the Committee of the Regions to what amounts to a branch 
of government, on part with the Commission, Council, and Parliament. It could also 
require (rather than simply condone) the participation of regional ministers in EU 
policymaking that touches on areas of regional competency. Strengthening the role 
of the regions at the supranational level would be consistent with the important 
role that regions already play within many EU member states [8, p. 102]. However, 
today such proposals are regarded as radical, which is why they will be unlikely 
apprehended by the EU member states. 
It should be taken into consideration that an automatic provision of the EU 
membership to separatist regional entities will ruin the balance of the EU institu-
tional mechanism. There will be a need in representation reconsideration of each 
state member in the EU institutions. (art. 14–17 the Treaty on European Union), 
change of the qualified vote majority calculation order (art. 16 the Treaty on 
European Union) and budgetary as well as structural funds access reallocation. In 
the Scottish and Catalan cases, then, secession would result in the creation of new 
states without breaking the continuity of the predecessor states. Still, the dimi-
nished British and Spanish states would face a reduction of their representation in 
EU bodies, which would require amendments to EU treaties even before the issue 
of membership for the new Scottish and Catalan states was addressed [8, p. 89]. 
Obviously, such situation does not meet interests of the European Union member 
states as a whole.  
Consider one more point: in virtue of the EU and NATO membership small 
states have a lot less problems with their own security provision in comparison to 
bigger states outside the abovementioned organizations [10, p. 16]. In case of a par-
ticular regional entity secession from the EU member state, it can be asserted with 
certainty that in order to meet the USA and EU geopоlotical interests, NATO will 
continue providing the separatist regions with military protection long before they 
are to acquire membership in the Alliance.
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This raises a question: “if one or another regional entity (for example, Catalo-
nia, Scotland or the Flemish region) of the EU member state will secede from the 
accordant state, what will be the consequences of such move?” The Treaty of Lis-
bon regulates only the situation when a member state desires to leave the EU. The 
Treaty of Lisbon tells us nothing regarding the membership of a country that was 
established by seceding a member state, which certainly is the EU member states’ 
concern [27]. However, it is believed, that the consequences for such region will be 
thoroughly understandable: a newly created state will not be the EU member neither 
de facto nor de jure. In case when it expresses a wish to acquire the EU membership, 
the state would have to pass all stages of the correspondent procedure – in terms of 
this requirement the European institutions demonstrate a sufficiently clear position.
Separatists usually affirm the fact that their regional entites may preserve the 
EU membership right after the negotiations concerning secession. [28]. They believe 
that the right for secession is based on provisions of the p.2 Treaty on European 
Union where the main democratic values and the supremacy of law in the EU 
are outlined. [20]. Furthermore, as an argument the following statement is being 
expressed: taking into account that many separatist regions are politically and eco-
nomically significant, their exclusion from the EU will create problems in the EU 
functioning and integrational process development.
However, that is a flase statement. The truth is that the pathway of becoming 
a EU member will be complicated, first of all, by the subjective factors and depend 
on the way the regional entity has “separated” with the “mother” state. It must be 
remembered that the accession to the EU requires consent of all member states, 
therefore, the membership acquirement by ex regions – newly established indepen-
dent states – may be blocked by the old ones. Some members of the EU, including 
Spain, have refused to recognize the independence of Kosovo in order not to create 
a precedent for the separatist regional entities on their territories. On the eve of 
the referendum in Scotland, Spain has warned the local separatists that Edinburgh 
would need no less than 8 years for the EU membership negotiations [29].
The most optimal way of the regional entity secession from the “mother” state 
composition is a civilized and legal one1. A legal and civilized way to secede from 
the United Kingdom was chosen by Scotland. In 2012 London and Edinburgh have 
reached agreement on Scotland Independence referendum holding. [30]. Opposition 
of the majority of participants has temporarily removed the question on the Scottish 
seccesion from the agenda. However, the victory of Brexit supporters at the 2016 
referendum has made the Scotts to negotiate the issue of the 2nd referendum holding 
regarding the Independence of Scotland and its membership in the European Union. 
If the aforementioned referendum will be conducted and the question concerning the 
1 «Сonsistent with the Canadian Supreme Court’s advisory opinion on Quebec [30, p. 133–135], 
states faced with separatist movements should consider allowing for referendums to gauge support 
for separation. There is no reason why the democratic principles that guided the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s framework for negotiated secession should not apply with equal force in democracies like 
Spain, the United Kingdom, and Belgium» [8, p. 101]. 
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secession will receive support, Scottish compliance with the constitutional proce-
dure of secession will ensure acceptable position of London that will not drastically 
discourage its pathway towards the EU membership. Though, it does not mean 
that the intention of Scotland to enter the European Union will be supported by 
all member states. Primarily, it applies to those countries, which contain separatist 
regional entites in their state composition. That is a path Belgium may take in case 
of its dissolution1. 
Another situation is when a region is implementing the secession in an unci-
vilized way2. In this instance, entry of a newly created state will be most likely 
blocked up by the “mother” state. The blocking of entry of such countries may be 
implemented by the other EU member states having separatist movements on their 
territory. Thus, Belgium facing the Flemish separatism issue, will unlikely support 
the secession of Scotland and its entry into the EU. In that regard, it is possible to 
recollect the situation of Kosovo unrecognition by Spain, Greece and Cyprus. 
The situation with the EU member state exit bears one more nuance. In the 
event of Scotland and Catalonia secession from the United Kingdom and Spain com-
position, the mentioned regions are forming a new state that has to enter the EU on 
general grounds. A slightly different situation takes place with the Flemish region. 
Flanders comprises the majority of Belgium’s territory and population and controls 
the lion’s share of its economic wealth, and it would thus be the most obvious can-
didate to inherit Belgium’s legal personality. That is, Flanders almost completely 
meet the requirements appointed by Michael P. Scharf [32, р. 67], that are consi-
dered in determining of the question regarding which part of the predecessor state 
will inherit its legal personality in case of dismemberment. To allow this outcome, 
however, the Flemish secession may be transformed into a situation where Flanders 
had, in effect, kicked Wallonia out of the Belgian state. The future of the Belgian 
state would undoubtedly be addressed as part of the negotiations leading to Flemish 
secession. The «velvet divorce» option that dissolved Czechoslovakia and created 
separate Czech and Slovak states in 1993 would have been preffered. The critical 
complication, however-which had no corollary in the Czechoslovak case⎯is Brussels. 
Both Flanders and Wallonia consider Brussels their capital [8, p. 89–90; 33; 34; 35]. 
The European Union, as a rule, remains neutral concerning the internal prob-
lems of the member states according to p. 2 art. 4 Treaty on European Union which 
points out that «The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the 
1 The basis for such conclusion provides Belgium with experience of transferring from unitary to 
fe deral governmental system. In this case, the dissolution of Belgium will resemble the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia, when both constituent entities have agreed on secession as a consequence of which 
neither Czech Republic nor Slovakia have ratified the legal person of Czechoslovakia in international 
organizations. It can be predicted that the Brussels’ status would face complications, since it is not 
only the kingdom’s capital but the headquarter of the EU itself.
2 Susanna Mancini, estimating such course of events’ scenario, indicates: «demonizing secession, turn-
ing it into a constitutional taboo, often adds fuel to secessionist claims. On the other hand, if seces-
sion is constructed as one among the many rights and options offered to a state’s subnational groups, 
chances are that it will lose much of its appeal» [31, р. 482]. 
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Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall 
respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of 
the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security» (the last 
sentence was included upon the request of Spain) [20]. This, in particular, means 
that each member state is capable of state governance self-determination, therefore 
Belgium, Austria, Germany are federal states as well as Great Britain and Spain are 
regional states whereas most of the EU member states are unitary.
At the current stage of integration, institutions of the Union demonstrate dedi-
cation to the idea of territorial integrity of the member states. Thus, EU Commission 
President Romano Prodi stated in April of 2004 that a newly independent region 
would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to the 
Union and the treaties would, from the day of its independence, not apply anymore 
on its territory1. Prodi also says that such a newly independent region would have to 
apply to become a member of the Union, under the normal process of adopting new 
members. The answer is a particular blow to nationalist parties in regions such as 
Scotland and Wales who have built their strategy of independence from Westminster 
on membership of the European Union [37]. 
Regarding the Catalon referendum held in October 2017 official representative 
of the European Commission Margaritis Schinas has declared that, firstly, the situ-
ation in Spain is the internal affair of Spain, which has to be resolved in accordance 
to Spanish law and order, secondly, according to the Constitution of Spain the 
voting was illicit, thirdly, if the referendum was held according to the Constitution 
of Spain, Catalonia shoud have exited the European Union, and, fourthly, parties of 
the conflict must pass from confrontation to a civilized dialogue in order to resolve 
the conflict [38].
With respect to sucession, the European Commission abides by norms and prin-
ciples of international law. In regard to this issue Christopher K. Connolly points 
out: «New states typically do not succeed to (i.e., automatically inherit) the inter-
national treaty obligations of their former parent states, especially with regard to 
treaties governing membership in international organizations. Instead, international 
organizations usually require new states to accede to (i.e., separately obtain) mem-
bership. Although secession from an EU member state would be without precedent 
and the EU’s governing treaties are silent as to how such a situation should be han-
dled, there are both legal and political reasons why it might adhere to the general 
requirement of accession» [8, p. 85].
Along with that, it should be borne in mind the EU is not a classic international 
organization but a political and legal formation functioning, for the most part, on 
1 Analogical position was taken by the Head of the European Commission Josй Manuel Durгo Barroso, 
during a September 2012 interview with the BBC and again in a December 2012 letter to the House 
of Lords, European Commission president Josй Manuel Barroso opined that a new state created by 
secession from an EU member state would have to apply for membership on its own, following the 
EU’s standard application procedure [36]. 
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the federalist principles. Introduction of EU citizenship institution accordingly 
creates certain complications (which are usually not indicated neither by politicias 
nor researchers) in terms of the membership acquirement by regional entities sece-
ding from EU member states. Residents of the separatist regions are EU citizens, 
therefore, are capable of requiring accession which would involve stripping them of 
citizenship pending readmission. This factor gives rise to doubts concerning what 
choice the European Union will make: abidance to the norms of treaties or achieve-
ment of the political compromise? And if the European Union is to chose the letter, 
what will be the compromise and what will be the way of forcing the member states 
to work it out?
Conclusion. The analysis provides an occasion to agree that under the contem-
porary circumstances the European Union will play a leading role in determining 
the results of Flemish, Scottish, and Catalan nationalist claims. The right to self-de-
termination as currently understood in international law provides little in the way 
of guidance for addressing separatist claims in Europe’s stateless nations. In Europe 
self-determination claims will increasingly be dealt with through the institutions of 
the European Union, as part of the ongoing push and pull among the EU, its member 
states, and sub-state regions [8, p. 105].
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Сепаратизм в об’єднаній Європі: стара проблема з новим обличчям
Досліджено питання, пов’язані з розвитком сепаратизму в Європейському Союзі. Наголо-
шено, що розвитку сепаратизму певною мірою сприяють процеси глобалізації та регіональної 
інтеграції, які можуть відігравати як інтегративну, так і деструктивну роль. Проаналізовано 
передумови розвитку сепаратизму в умовах європейської інтеграції, а також форми його реа-
лізації. Реалізація Європейським Союзом регіональної політики, що заснована на принципах солі-
дарності і субсидіарності, не знімає проблему сепаратизму в об’єднаній Європі  як таку. Значною 
мірою це обумовлено тим, що в сучасних умовах  культурно-мовна ідентичність не завжди вико-
ристовується сепаратистськими рухами в їх боротьбі. Дедалі більшого значення набувають еко-
номічні чинники цього процессу.
Сепаратизм в ЄС має й іншу особливість. Вона пов’язана з питанням членства в Європей-
ському Союзі сепаратистських регіонів держав-членів у разі їх виходу з «материнської» держави. 
Зазначено, що у випадку позаправового механізму виходу зі складу держави прагнення сепара-
тистських регіонів набути членство в ЄС зіткнеться насамперед зі спротивом тих держав-чле-
нів, які мають у своєму складі подібні регіони. Інститути ЄС сьогодні також стоять на позиції 
не визнання права регіонів держав-членів автоматично набути членства в Євросоюзі у разі виходу 
зі складу «материнської держави».
Обґрунтовано висновок, відповідно до якого в перспективі в об’єднаній Європі вимоги щодо 
самовизначення регіонів будуть все частіше розглядатися через інститути Європейського Союзу 
в умовах посилення напруги між ЄС, його державами-членами та регіонами держав-членів.
Ключові слова: сепаратизм; регіоналізм; Європейський Союз; європейська інтеграція; член-
ство в організації.
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